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Abstract 
This paper uses a global data set of 350 microfinance institutions (MFIs) in 70 countries to 
study the common belief that women are generally better credit risks in microfinance than 
men. The results confirm that a higher percentage of female clients in MFIs is associated with 
lower portfolio risk, fewer write-offs, and fewer provisions, all else being equal. Interaction 
effects reveal that, while focus on women is generally associated with enhanced repayment, 
this trend is stronger for nongovernmental organizations, individual-based lenders, and 
regulated MFIs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Microfinance—financial services tailored to the poor—has been celebrated for its ability to 
reach out to women and enhance their welfare. Since its beginning as experimental schemes 
in Asia and Latin America in the 1970s, microfinance has been concerned, above all, with 
women. The objective of the Microcredit Summit Campaign, which plays a central role in the 
promotion of microfinance, is ―to ensure that 175 million of the world’s poorest families, 
especially women, receive credit for self-employment and other financial and business 
services‖ (our emphasis).1 Indeed, many microfinance institutions (MFIs) do target women. In 
this study’s data set, women represent 73% of microfinance customers, similar to figures 
reported in previous literature (e.g., Cull et al., 2007). The strong appeal of microfinance also 
lies in its high repayment records. In our data set, only 6% of the total loan portfolio, on 
average, is overdue more than 30 days, and only 1% will be written off, on average. From a 
credit design perspective, this is interesting, since modern microfinance was intended as a 
response to the high default rates in subsidized rural credit, mostly provided to men, in the 
1950–1980’s (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). 
 
The targeting of women has been suggested to generate high repayment rates for MFIs. 
Microfinance advocacy networks and sponsors, as well as bilateral and multilateral 
development aid agencies, regularly assert that women are good credit risks. For example, the 
World Bank argues (2007), ―Experience has shown that repayment is higher among female 
borrowers, mostly due to more conservative investments and lower moral hazard risk‖ 
(p. 124). Armendariz and Morduch (2005, p. 139), evaluating different techniques to reduce 
repayment defaults, consider the targeting of women as a technique in its own right, alongside 
group lending and dynamic repayment incentives. 
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But do we actually know that women are better credit risks than men? The fact is that the 
relation between an MFI’s repayment performance and its targeting of women has hardly 
been rigorously studied, and existing empirical evidence is mixed. Besides anecdotal evidence 
and the analysis of one or two MFIs in a given country (see, e.g., Khandker et al., 1995, in 
Bangladesh and Kevane and Wydick, 2001, in Guatemala), no paper provides a detailed 
empirical analysis of the gender–repayment relation within a global and longitudinal context. 
Sponsors seem to raise the repayment argument without ever furnishing empirical evidence. 
We thus respond to Cornwall et al. (2007), who argue that gender development discourses are 
too often based on myths and simplistic slogans. 
 
This paper sets out to be the first rigorous global study of the relation between MFI gender 
focus and repayment performance, using a data set spanning 350 MFIs in 70 countries over 11 
years. Repayment is studied through a variety of measures, such as portfolios at risk, write-
offs, and provision expenses. We take into account the specific methodological problems 
associated with this type of estimation, such as a) isolating the gender effect from other MFI 
or institutional influences on repayment and b) the time-invariant nature of many covariates. 
 
The findings indicate that a higher percentage of female clients is significantly associated 
with lower portfolio risk and fewer portfolio write-offs, after controlling for a number of MFI-
specific factors, as well as institutional factors. Additionally, MFIs with a higher proportion of 
female clients carry fewer provisions, additional evidence that focusing on women 
significantly reduces MFIs’ perceived credit risk. Findings further indicate that not all MFIs 
benefit to a similar degree from targeting women. Interaction effects reveal that specifically 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), individual-based lenders, and regulated MFIs benefit 
more from focusing on women. The finding that identifiable MFI characteristics interact with 
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the targeting of women is particularly interesting, since this can inform both microfinance 
practitioners and those interested in gender policies. 
 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on gender and 
repayment and presents the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the data and the 
statistical methods employed. Section 4 reports our findings and discusses a number of 
robustness checks carried out. Section 5 presents the study’s conclusions and possible 
implications. 
 
2. GENDER AND REPAYMENT 
There is no lack of studies arguing that women outperform men in terms of repayment in 
microfinance. For instance, Armendariz and Morduch (2005) report that, in its initial phase, 
the Grameen Bank included men among its customers. However, the bank decided to switch 
to a nearly entirely female clientele due to repayment problems with men. Hossain (1988) 
reports that in Bangladesh, 81% of women had no repayment problems, compared with 74% 
of men. Similarly, Khandker et al. (1995) find that 15.3% of Grameen’s male borrowers had 
repayment problems, compared with only 1.3% of the women. In addition, in Bangladesh, 
Sharma and Zeller (1997) report that credit groups with higher percentages of women had 
significantly better repayment rates. From Malawi, Hulme (1991) reports that 92% of women 
paid on time, compared with 83% of men, and Gibbons and Kasim (1991) find that in 
Malaysia 95% of women repaid their loans, compared with 72% of the men. Finally, in a 
study from Guatemala, Kevane and Wydick (2001) report that female credit groups had better 
loan repayment records than male groups. 
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On the other hand, a number of more recent studies find that, when controlling for other 
factors, there is no significant relation between gender and repayment. Enhanced female 
repayment rates are driven by a focus on nonfinancial services in the case of Bangladesh 
(Godquin, 2004), the adaptation of loan methodologies to local contexts in the United States 
(Bhatt and Tang, 2002), and group methodology, local economic opportunities, and types of 
clients’ livelihoods in Ethiopia (Brehanu and Fufa, 2008). Finally, BRI, in Indonesia, has 
never had any specific focus on women but has achieved nearly perfect repayment rates over 
several years (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005). Perhaps the argument of women being better 
credit risks is not as clear-cut after all? The fact that former studies are based on anecdotal 
evidence or are very limited in geographical and institutional scope warrants the need for this 
global study. 
 
Why would women be better in honoring their loan contracts than men? One argument is that 
women invest in types of businesses that allow easier repayment. For instance, based upon her 
experience in Grameen villages in Bangladesh, Todd (1996) argues that women are more 
conservative or cautious in their investment strategies and therefore have better repayment 
records. Recently, Agier and Szafarz (2010) find similar results in Brazil. Johnson (2004) 
highlights that women’s business activities often imply a quick turnover, which is more 
adaptable to the regular repayments demanded by most MFIs. By contrast, seasonal and risky 
activities such as agriculture, which are more often a male preserve, are a poor fit to 
microfinance modalities (Morvant-Roux, forthcoming). In many countries, there is also a long 
collective history of debt forgiveness in agriculture, which often translates into a male culture 
of ―nonrepayment‖ (Servet, 2006). Another argument is that women have fewer credit 
opportunities than men and must repay their loans to ensure continued access to credit 
(Armendariz and Morduch, 2005). A premise of these arguments is that the women are 
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actually the ones controlling the loans; however, several studies indicate that loans taken out 
by women are in some cases used and controlled by the men within their households (Goetz 
and Gupta, 1996; Rahman, 1999; Kabeer, 2001; Mayoux, 2001). Thus, if men are the ones 
using the loans, the former arguments do not hold. 
 
However, regardless of who controls the money, it still make sense for the MFI to know 
whether contracting with women lead to better repayment performance than contracting with 
men. Along this line, several papers argue that contracts with women are easier to monitor 
and enforce. For example, Rahman (2001) and Goetz and Gupta (1996) indicate that women 
are more easily influenced by peer pressure in credit groups and more sensitive to the 
interventions of loan officers. Ameen (2004) states that women have a lower opportunity cost 
of time than men and are therefore more inclined to have contact with the MFI and credit 
groups, with a positive impact on repayment. Moreover, female customers tend to stay closer 
to home rather than going out to work, and can therefore be more easily monitored by the 
MFI (Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Armendariz and Morduch, 2005). 
 
Not all arguments favor women as a good credit risk, however. The simple fact that women, 
on average, are poorer than their male peers should indicate that repayments are more 
troublesome. Phillips and Bhatia-Panthaki (2007) contend that women entrepreneurs tend to 
be overrepresented in traditional sectors with lower profits, fewer growth opportunities, and 
harsher competition, which should make them less able to honor their credit contracts. 
 
Given the previous discussions, the relation between gender and repayment-rates remains 
unclear. However, in line with common beliefs in the industry, we propose the following 
main hypothesis: 
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H1. MFIs with a greater female focus exhibit better repayment performance. 
 
Female focus is measured by the proportion of female customers and with a dummy 
indicating whether the MFI has a female gender bias in its lending policies. Better repayment 
performance is measured by the proportion of portfolios overdue by at least 30 days (portfolio 
at risk) and the percentage of the loan portfolio that is written off because of nonrepayment 
(write-off ratio). For robustness, we also analyze the relation between gender and loan loss 
provisions
2
 and call this the perceived credit risk hypothesis: 
 
H2. MFIs with a greater female focus exhibit lower perceived credit risk. 
 
In addition to our main hypotheses, it is interesting to know whether the relation between 
gender and repayment performance is greater for certain categories of MFIs. We analyze 
whether the gender effect on repayment differs with MFI experience, legal status, scope of 
activities, lending methodology, and regulation. 
 
a. Experience 
An MFI’s experience can influence the relation between gender and repayment in different 
ways. First, the gender difference can be a short-run effect. It is likely that women repay 
better simply because they enjoy the accessibility to a service that was previously denied to 
them, but then this effect should decrease over time. Second, MFIs can change their internal 
procedures for stimulating repayment as they grow older. For instance, they could move 
toward either stricter and more coercive enforcement methods or, instead, a system based on 
trust and responsibility. Since male and female customers may respond differently toward 
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these altered repayment procedures, we expect the gender–repayment relation to be 
influenced by MFI experience, which can be described by the following hypothesis: 
 
H3a. The relation between female focus and repayment differs with the MFI’s experience. 
 
b. Legal status 
Mersland (2009a) explains how differences in legal status and ownership structure 
differentiate MFIs. Often NGOs have broader objectives and can be more interested in 
developing specific gender policies influencing their mobilization methods or repayment 
policies (Mayoux, forthcoming). For instance, an NGO dedicated toward serving more 
marginalized customers such as women could emphasize closer monitoring, whereas a bank 
may adopt a more formal enforcement policy. Male and female customers can respond 
differently toward these differences in repayment policies. We thus propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H3b. The relation between female focus and repayment differs with the MFI’s legal status. 
 
c. Scope of activities 
Some MFIs offer a range of nonfinancial services alongside microfinance, such as health 
services and basic literacy training (Godquin, 2004) or business training (Khandker et al., 
1995). Edgcomb and Barton (1998) suggest that nonfinancial services improve not only the 
borrower’s ability to repay but also the quality of the relations between MFIs and their clients. 
Since they are generally poorer and have lower education, women can be expected to be more 
responsive and more in need of the additional training (Mayoux, 2001; Armendariz and 
Morduch, 2005). Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
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H3c. The relation between female focus and repayment differs with the MFI’s scope of 
activities. 
 
d. Lending methodology 
MFIs employ various lending methodologies, such as village banking, solidarity groups, and 
individual-based lending (Sharma and Zeller, 1997; Kevane and Wydick, 2001). There is no 
clear evidence that group lending (solidarity groups and village banks) leads to better 
repayment rates for women (see, e.g., Sharma and Zeller, 1997; Kevane and Wydick, 2001). 
However, it is still considered a female method, since women more readily join groups and 
spend time in group meetings. (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005; Mayoux, forthcoming). In 
conclusion, the relation between gender and repayment can be influenced by the MFI lending 
methodology: 
 
H3d. The relation between female focus and repayment differs with the MFI’s lending 
methodology. 
 
e. Regulation 
Regulated MFIs are monitored by banking authorities. It is argued that regulation can lead to 
mission drift if requirements divert attention away from serving the poor, but this has not been 
rigorously studied (Mersland and Strøm, 2010). Others argue that regulations can hold back 
innovation in lending technologies, which has been a driving force in microfinance 
development and outreach to women (Dichter, 1997; Hardy et al., 2003). Regulated MFIs can 
experience more pressure than non-regulated MFIs from regulating authorities, who can have 
an influence on their enforcement strategies. Male and female customers may respond 
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differently to diverse repayment procedures resulting from regulation, as pinpointed in the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3e. The relation between female focus and repayment differs with the MFI’s regulatory 
status. 
 
3. DATA AND ESTIMATION METHODS 
(a) Data and summary statistics 
Data for 350 MFIs from 70 countries have been extracted from assessment reports gathered 
by specialized rating agencies supported by the first rating fund of the Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor (www.ratingfund2.org). A major advantage of using these assessment reports 
is that they are compiled by a third party and cover a wide range of organizational features, 
along with social and financial indicators. For example, with respect to gender, the data set 
contains information on the proportion of female customers, and, in addition, the rating 
agencies in the reports attest to whether the MFIs have a female gender bias in their policies 
and lending practices. 
 
The data set contains a wide variety of different MFI types, with 187 NGOs (53.4%), 44 
cooperatives (12.5%), and 119 (34.1%) bank institutions. The latter category contains banks, 
non-bank financial institutions, and state banks. The distributions across countries and legal 
statuses are given in Appendix A. In most cases (48.8%) we have four firm–years of data.3 
The ratings are performed in the period 2001–2008, which means that we have data from 
1998 to 2008. Most data are from the period 2001–2007. No data set is perfectly 
representative of the microfinance field. In particular, ours contains relatively little data from 
mega-sized MFIs and does not cover the virtually endless numbers of small savings and credit 
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cooperatives. However, rating data are considered among the most representative available for 
the microfinance industry (Mersland, 2009b), and compared to data from the Mixmarket 
(www.themix.org) a large firm bias is better avoided. For example, while Mixmarket 2006 
Benchmarks based on data from 704 MFIs report mean and median total assets of 45,6 and 
6,2 million US dollars respectively, the mean total assets for the MFIs included in this study 
are 6,5 million and the median MFI holds 1,9 million in assets.  
 
Table 1 reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and quartiles for a 
number of key variables in our sample. We see that the average MFI has a total loan portfolio 
of $4,225,000, serves 17,111 clients, and has nine years of experience in microfinance. The 
average outstanding loan is $787 and annual net returns are $209,000. The annual portfolio 
yield is 0.39, on average, illustrating the high interest rates typical in microfinance, and 
operational self-sufficiency (OSS) is 1.12, indicating that, on average, the MFI covers its 
operating costs. 
 
As far as the repayment variables are concerned, PaR30 equals 0.06, on average, which means 
that 6% of the total loan portfolio is 30 days or more overdue. However, the median value is 
only 3%, which indicates that the distribution is somewhat skewed, with a number of MFIs 
with high PaR30 values. On average, write-offs comprise around 1% of the total loan 
portfolio, and the median value is also 1%. The provision expense rate is 3%, on average, 
with a median value of 2%.  
 
For the gender variables, we see that, on average, MFIs have 73% female clients. Moreover, 
the 75th percentile in the distribution of female clients is 1, indicating that at least 25% of the 
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MFIs focus exclusively on women. The conscious gender bias dummy variable indicates that 
around 40% of MFIs have a female bias in their lending. 
 
< Insert ―Table 1. Summary statistics‖ here > 
 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix of the gender and repayment variables (Panel A), as well 
as discrete median values for some key variables for different proportions of female 
borrowers (Panel B). As can be seen from Panel A, there is a negative correlation between the 
proportion of female borrowers and both PaR30 (-0.02) and write-offs (-0.09), indicating that 
MFIs with more female borrowers have better repayment rates (Hypothesis 1). Additionally, 
the correlation between the proportion of female borrowers and the provision expense rate is 
also negative (-0.14; Hypothesis 2). 
 
Panel B of Table 2 analyzes the median values of a number of key variables in classes that 
differ in their proportions of female borrowers, from ―very low‖ to ―very high.‖ The different 
cut-off points correspond to the quartiles in the distribution of female clients. As can be seen 
from Panel B of Table 2, the median PaR30 values are 0.03 and 0.05, respectively, for the 
classes with very low and low proportions of female clients, higher than for the classes with 
high (0.02) and very high (0.01) proportions. Median write-offs more or less mirror the 
PaR30 results. Similar findings emerge for the provision expense rate, indicating that MFIs 
with a higher proportion of female clients carry fewer provisions, supporting our second 
hypothesis, that female clients are perceived as a better credit risk. Other variables indicate 
that lending to women usually occurs in a different context than lending to men. For instance, 
the portfolio yield usually increases with a gender bias, suggesting higher interest rates are 
being charged to female clients. Furthermore, smaller loan sizes are usually associated with 
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greater female focus. The relation between costs and female focus is less clear. While the 
variable costs per dollar lent is higher in the high female focus class, it is lower in the very 
high class. 
 
< Insert ―Table 2. Correlations and univariate statistics‖ around here> 
 
(b) Estimation methods 
To test our hypotheses, we use panel data regression techniques where we regress repayment 
in terms of PaR30, write-off rate, and provision expense rate on our gender variables 
(proportion of female clients and the conscious gender bias dummy), controlling for a variety 
of MFI-specific and institutional controls. For instance, to test Hypothesis 1, we regress 
PaR30 on the proportion of female borrowers as follows: 
 
     (1) 
 
where PaR30i,t is the portfolio at risk for MFI i in year t; FEMi,t is the percentage of female 
clients; Zi,t is a matrix of MFI-specific controls, such as size, experience, average loan size, 
dummies for lending methodology, and rural/urban market activity; and Xi,t is a matrix of  
controls that capture the conditions of the country C in which the MFI is active. 
 
A number of methodological issues surrounding this kind of estimation require close 
attention. First, it is important that all variables potentially affecting repayment be included 
explicitly as controls in the regression equation. If variables are omitted that affect repayment 
and which are also correlated with the proportion of female borrowers, ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimates could be biased (Stock and Watson, 2007, p. 186). Therefore, in addition to 
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OLS, we also analyze a pooled random effects (RE) model that takes into account unobserved 
MFI-specific effects as follows: 
 
    (2) 
 
where i is the unobserved MFI-specific effect. The main benefit of such an RE model is that 
it accounts for all unobserved heterogeneity potentially affecting the dependent variable, 
thereby reducing concerns for omitted variables bias (Lensink and Mersland, 2009; Hartarska, 
2005). 
 
Second, many of the controls that need to be estimated are time invariant. The RE model is 
therefore better suited than, for instance, a fixed effects (FE) model, where time-invariant 
covariates cannot be estimated because all variables are first-differenced. However, 
incorporating time-invariant covariates in an RE model requires the additional assumption 
that they never be correlated with the unobserved MFI-specific effect. When this assumption 
does not hold, the RE estimator can yield inconsistent and biased estimates (Baltagi et al., 
2003). Therefore, besides performing pooled OLS and RE, we also report the fixed effects 
vector decomposition (FEVD) estimator developed by Plümper and Troeger (2007) and 
applied to microfinance performance regressions in Lensink and Mersland (2009). This 
estimator is designed to tackle time-invariant covariates and unobserved effects in the context 
of panel data and employs a three-stage estimation procedure. The first stage estimates a pure 
fixed-effects model to obtain an estimate of the unobserved MFI-specific effects. The second 
stage decomposes the fixed effects into two parts, one explained by the time-invariant 
variables and the other unexplained. The third stage re-estimates the model, including the 
time-invariant variables and the error term of the second stage, using pooled OLS.  
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Finally, repayments can vary over time because of idiosyncratic or macro-level shocks. We 
account for this by including time dummies in all regressions and using clustered standard 
errors. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
(a) Relation between gender and repayment 
Table 3 reports the impact of gender on repayment in terms of the portfolio at risk (Panel A) 
and write-off rate (Panel B). The different columns correspond to the different estimation 
methods (OLS, RE, and FEVD). Looking at columns (1) to (3) in Panel A, we see that the 
proportion of female borrowers is negatively related to the portfolio at risk, regardless of the 
estimation method. This negative relation is statistically significant at the 5% level for OLS 
and RE, and at 1% level for FEVD.
4
 Moreover, the coefficients are quite robust over the 
estimation methods with estimated values -0.05 for OLS, -0.08 for RE, and -0.09 for FEVD. A 
value of -0.05 suggests that a marginal increase in female clients with 10 percentage points 
(say from an average 60% to 70%) decreases PaR30 with 0.5 percentage points (say from an 
average 6% to 5.5%). Additionally, the regression statistics (F-statistic for OLS and FEVD 
and χ² statistic for RE) always denote joint significance of the models. Note that the number 
of MFIs per country is always added as an extra time-invariant control to address the bias 
resulting from varying degrees of MFI intervention in different countries. 
 
Examining the other controls, we see that mainly size, portfolio growth, dumRURAL, and HDI 
are significantly related to PaR30. In particular, a lower PaR30 is associated with larger MFIs, 
MFIs with higher portfolio growth, and MFIs operating in rural areas, as well as in more 
developed countries. These effects are robust over the estimation methods. Finding that MFIs 
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that grow faster have a lower PaR30 is not surprising, since a significant part of the portfolio 
is new and still uncontaminated. It is interesting to find that rural lending carries less risk, 
since lending to farmers has historically been associated with high risk. This finding could 
suggest that lending in rural areas does not necessarily mean agricultural lending, but rather 
finance non-farm activities in rural areas (Morvant-Roux, forthcoming). Alternatively, this 
finding could indicate that typical enforcement mechanisms like credit officer pressure, social 
pressure and peer pressure work best in rural communities. It should also be kept in mind that 
few of the small savings and credit cooperatives that typically operate in rural areas are 
included in our sample. The rural MFIs included in the sample might thus not be fully 
representative for rural microfinance lenders. The coefficients for experience and the 
efficiency measures (staff efficiency, credit officer efficiency) are insignificant and close to 
zero. Similarly, whether the MFI is an NGO or not and whether it practices group or 
individual lending have little or no effect on portfolio at risk. This finding is in line with 
Mersland and Strøm (2008), who find that performance differences between NGOs and non-
NGOs are minimal, and Mersland and Strøm (2009a), who demonstrate that group lending 
has only a limited effect on repayment. 
 
In columns (4) to (6) of Table 3, gender preference is measured through the dummy variable 
for conscious gender bias. As can be seen, this dummy is, like the proportion of female 
clients, negatively related to the portfolio at risk, with the coefficients being highly 
significant. Those MFIs that report a conscious bias toward women have a significantly lower 
PaR30, and estimated coefficients range between -0.01 for OLS and -0.02 for RE and FEVD. 
A value of -0.02 indicates that the PaR30 of MFIs that have a deliberate focus on women is, 
on average, 2 percentage points lower. Given an average PaR30 of 6% in the entire sample, 
this result is not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant. Looking at the 
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controls, we again see a negative association with size, portfolio growth, dumRURAL, and 
HDI consistent with the previous discussion. 
 
In Panel B of Table 3, repayment is measured by the actual loan loss write-offs, and again 
gender is measured through both the proportion of female borrowers and the dummy for 
conscious gender bias. As can be seen from columns (1) to (3) of Panel B, the negative 
relation between the proportion of female borrowers and the write-off rate is highly 
significant at the 1% level (coefficients are -0.03, regardless of the estimation method). 
Similarly, columns (4) to (6) indicate that an MFI that focuses on women has 1% lower write-
offs, the effects being significant at the 1% level. Overall, the results from Table 3 imply a 
negative association between the number of female clients and repayment, confirming 
Hypothesis 1. 
 
< Insert ―Table 3. Gender and loan repayment‖ around here > 
 
In Table 4 we use a similar methodology as in Table 3 to analyze the impact of gender on 
provisions, measured as the provision expense rate. As can be seen from columns (1) to (3) of 
Table 4, the coefficient for the proportion of women clients is always negative and 
significance levels vary between 10% for RE and 1% for OLS and FEVD. This means that an 
MFI with a higher proportion of female clients carries significantly fewer provisions. 
Similarly, columns (4) to (6) of Table 4 indicate negative coefficients for conscious gender 
bias, regardless of the estimation method. Regarding the control variables, the main difference 
with Table 3 is that NGOs carry more provisions than non-NGOs. This is not surprising, since 
the former are generally unregulated and often do not pay taxes, allowing them to fix their 
 20 
own level of provisions and write-offs. Overall, we find consistent evidence that MFIs that 
focus on women clients carry fewer provisions, confirming Hypothesis 2. 
 
< Insert ―Table 4. Gender and provisions‖ around here> 
 
(b) Interaction effects 
As outlined in the theory section, the effect of female focus on MFI repayment performance 
can be more prevalent under certain conditions or apply more for certain categories of MFIs. 
Interaction terms in the regression equations are therefore included as follows: 
 
 (3) 
 
where all variables are defined as in equation (2) and FEMi,t * INTi,t  is the interaction term 
that measures whether the effect of gender on repayment differs with the interaction variables 
INTi,t. 
 
Regression outputs with respect to the interaction terms are shown in Table 5, where RE is 
used as the estimation method. Panel A of Table 5 analyzes gender in terms of the proportion 
of female clients, and Panel B measures gender in terms of the conscious gender bias dummy. 
The different columns represent the different interaction terms that were added subsequently. 
In the last column, all interaction variables are taken up simultaneously to study the isolated 
impact of each interaction. Note that the coefficient for women clients (Panel A) and 
conscious gender bias (Panel B) now represents the relation between gender and repayment in 
the reference category, whereas the sum of the reference coefficient and the coefficient for the 
interaction term indicate the gender repayment relation for the different categories. 
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As can be seen from column (1) of both Panels A and B of Table 5, the interaction term 
(women clients * experience) returns an insignificant coefficient close to zero, which indicates 
that the relation between gender and repayment does not differ with MFI experience. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 3a cannot be supported. On the other hand, when it comes to legal 
status, both Panels A and B of Table 5 indicate that NGOs benefit more than non-NGOs from 
a female focus when it comes to repayment performance. The effect not only is found in the 
individual regression but also persists when the other interactions are added, as can be seen 
from column (6). Hypothesis 3b is thus supported. 
 
Column (3) of Panels A and B of Table 5 indicate that the relation between gender focus and 
repayment performance does not depend on whether the MFI provides microfinance services 
only or whether it has a broader scope of activities. Hypothesis 3c is thus rejected. As for 
regulation status and lending method, we note that the signs for the former are generally 
negative and the signs for the latter generally positive, and most often significant in columns 
(4) and (5) of both panels of Table 5. Moreover, the signs and significance levels are upheld 
when all interaction variables are included (column 6). Hypotheses 3d and 3e are therefore 
supported. The relation between female focus and enhanced repayment is stronger for MFIs 
that provide individual loans and for regulated MFIs. 
 
Overall, we find that the general positive relation between focus on women and repayment is 
indeed different for different categories of MFIs. We find substantial support for Hypotheses 
3b, 3d, and 3e, indicating that the association between female focus on repayment varies with 
the MFI’s legal status, regulatory status, and lending methodology. We find no support for 
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Hypotheses 3a and 3c, indicating that the female focus - repayment relation does not vary 
with the MFI’s experience or scope of services.5 
 
These findings suggest that there are two mechanisms that can actively reinforce the positive 
relation between women and repayment: First, MFIs that practice a more personalized, tailor-
made approach adapted to the needs of women are likely to increase the positive impact of 
women on repayment. Compared to banks, NGOs are more likely to adopt specific gender 
policies such as a women-friendly design of financial products. For instance, amounts and 
repayment modalities can be adapted to women’s specific financial needs (Johnson, 2004) 
and collateral requirements can include female forms of property (Mayoux, 2001). Gender 
policies can also include women-friendly customer relationships, such as easy procedures, 
flexible timing, and accessible locations of service (Mayoux, 2001) or general gender 
awareness in staff recruitment and staff management (Goetz, 2001; Mayoux, 2001). 
 
In addition, it is easier for individual lenders to design more personalized services. In 
microfinance this is particularly interesting, since a common belief is that women usually 
enjoy group lending. However, as argued by Harper (2007), group lending is all too often a 
―second-hand‖ method, and a way to shift transaction costs onto female borrowers (Mayoux, 
2001; Wright, 2006; Rao, 2008). Our findings illustrate that when women are offered 
individual tailor-made loans, repayment is enhanced, compared to group-lending methods. 
 
Second, MFIs that are regulated are likely to increase the positive relation between women 
and repayment. This result supports Fernando (2006), who finds that regulation can translate 
into more coercive enforcement methods (social pressure, verbal hostility, harassment, etc.), 
and that women can be more responsive to such practices. Indeed, in the face of close 
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regulatory supervision, the MFI may install harsher enforcement policies to avoid penalties 
from failing to meet high repayment standards. In Bangladesh, for instance, regulation and 
commercialization have strongly influenced credit officers’ behaviors, leading to stricter 
enforcement methods (Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Rahman, 1999, 2004). In India, where women 
sometimes represent 95% of an MFI’s clientele, regulation and competition constraints have 
led to ―abusive collection methods‖ (Ghate, 2007). 
 
< Insert ―Table 5. Interactions on the gender-repayment relation‖ around here > 
 
(c) Further analyses 
A number of tests have been carried out to test the robustness of the results and analyze 
findings more in detail. Specifically, since the legal status dummy only includes NGOs versus 
non-NGOs, we want to see whether the results hold for more specific groups of MFIs. Table 6 
presents split-sample regressions, where the main regressions are repeated for different MFI 
types. We distinguish between all MFIs, NGOs, cooperatives, and the category BANK, 
consisting of banks, non-bank financial institutions, and state banks. The results, shown in 
Table 6, reconfirm that, in general, more women clients are associated with a lower PaR30 
(Panel A), lower write-offs (Panel B), and lower provision expenses (Panel C), but that the 
effects are more pronounced for NGOs and cooperatives than for banks. 
 
Outliers may be driving the statistical results. While obvious outliers have been omitted from 
all analyses, we want to see whether the results remain stable when enforcing tougher 
procedures for treating outliers. Table 7 presents an outlier robustness check, where the main 
analyses are repeated for the sample and observations below the fifth and above the 95th 
percentile for the repayment variables have been dropped. As can be seen, the coefficients of 
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the proportion of female clients are -0.05, -0.03, and -0.03, respectively, for the PaR30, write-
off, and provision expense regressions, similar to the previous analyses.
6
 
 
Finally, in Table 8 we repeat some of the main analyses, using Tobin’s truncated regressions 
to account for the fact that the bulk of observations for the repayment variables often lie 
within a very specific range and could therefore be considered dependent variables truncated 
above and below certain threshold values. As can be seen from Table 8, coefficients for the 
gender variables remain negative, with similar confidence levels and values. 
 
< Insert ―Table 6. Split-sample regressions for different organizational types‖ around here > 
 
< Insert ―Table 7. Robustness check for outliers‖ around here> 
 
< Insert ―Table 8. Tobit truncated regressions‖ around here > 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper uses a large global data set covering 350 MFIs in 70 countries to test for gender 
effects on MFI repayment performance. This is important, given the undocumented popular 
belief that women honor their microfinance loans more readily than men. As far as we know, 
no rigorous worldwide empirical study has been devoted to this issue. Repayment behavior is 
studied through a variety of measures, such as the portfolio at risk, loan loss write-offs, and 
provisions. Gender is studied through the proportion of female clients, as well as a dummy 
variable that indicates whether the MFI has a female gender bias in its lending policies. To 
test our hypotheses, panel data regression techniques such as OLS, pooled random effects 
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(RE), and fixed effects vector decomposition (FEVD) are applied. In addition, several tests 
have been carried out to test the robustness of the results. 
 
Our findings indicate that MFIs with higher proportions of female borrowers have lower 
portfolio at risk and lower write-off rates. A dummy variable indicating whether the MFI has 
a conscious gender bias toward women yields similar results. Using loan loss provisions as an 
alternative dependent variable also yields similar results. The combined findings provide 
compelling evidence that focusing on female clients enhances MFI repayment performance 
and that women in general are better credit risks. Interaction terms further reveal that the 
positive association between female focus and repayment is particularly strong for NGOs, 
individual lenders, and regulated MFIs. This suggests a number of mechanisms through which 
female repayment rates are actively being reinforced. For example, NGOs are more likely to 
adopt specific gender policies in their design of financial products, repayment modalities, and 
operational procedures. Likewise, individual-based lending offers interesting opportunities to 
offer personalized services and better monitoring. The result that regulation impacts on the 
gender–repayment relation can be indicative of coercive enforcement methods to which 
women are more responsive. 
 
The results have important implications, for both the microfinance industry and gender policy. 
This paper confirms policymakers’ and practitioners’ long-standing argument that women are, 
on average, good credit risks for MFIs. Despite women’s lower objective creditworthiness, 
they repay their loans better than male clients. This suggests that it may be worthwhile for 
MFIs to target women in order to reduce credit-risk. However, the univariate findings 
reported in Table 2 also illustrate that focusing on female clients is associated with smaller 
loans and lower Operational Self Sufficiency (OSS). Thus, despite women’s better repayment 
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behavior, lending to women might not be the best business case for MFIs. Further research is 
thus needed to assess the overall economic impact for the MFI of focusing on female clients.  
Such research should go beyond the gender–repayment relation and look into how focusing 
on women can influence different MFI outcomes such as cost structures, profitability, funding 
structures, and MFI governance. 
The finding that individual lenders benefit more from focusing on women should motivate 
researchers to study further how different lending contracts influence MFI performance in 
general and repayment in particular. This finding should also motivate practitioners to assess 
whether group loans, which are often not appreciated by the poor, can be replaced with 
individual loans. Likewise, the finding that NGOs, in terms of repayment performance, 
benefit more from focusing on women is interesting in the transformation debate, where 
NGOs are motivated to transform into commercial banks (Ledgerwood and White, 2006). 
As far as gender policy is concerned, our findings are mixed. Questions of repayment and 
MFI performance should not overshadow the more fundamental issue of the well-being of 
female clients. Higher repayment rates do not necessarily mean improved welfare for women. 
Microfinance can contribute to female empowerment, but can also lead to the feminization of 
debt (Mayoux, 2001). Moreover, good repayment performance may not necessarily 
correspond to client satisfaction but, conversely, can be indicative of debt traps (Cull et al., 
2008). As suggested here, improved repayment performance can stem from enforcement 
practices that are more feared by women than men. The implications of regulation on female 
repayment should thus be examined more closely. 
On a wider scale, future research is needed to analyze in greater detail the reasons for better 
repayment by women. Is it because they are better in carrying out their businesses or are 
involved in types of businesses that allow for easier repayment? Is it because they are more 
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risk averse? Or is it because women honor their contracts more so than men, or that women 
are easier to monitor and enforce? In addition, given that the microfinance industry is 
increasingly concerned with the trade-off between financial performance and social mission 
(Copestake, 2007; Cull et al., 2008; Hudon 2009), it is our belief that the question of gender 
in this trade-off debate demands particular attention. 
As any other study, this paper is not free from data limitations. While we believe that the 
third-party check related to rating data is a considerable improvement over unmonitored data 
sources, one could argue that MFIs can influence repayment variables to secure future funds 
from donors or improved standing with regulators. However, we see no reason why female-
focused MFIs should alter their data more than other MFIs. Second, the interaction-analyses 
could be influenced by non-random selection of specific groups into the dataset. While this 
influence cannot be fully eliminated, we believe the magnitude and composition of our 
sample reduce this concern.   
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ENDNOTES 
 
1
 See www.microcreditsummit.org. 
2
 For some regulated MFIs, the regulator defines the minimum levels of provision, whereas in some countries 
local tax authorities can impose maximum levels. Most MFIs do, however, define their own final level of risk 
provisions. 
3
 For 11 MFIs (3%) we have 5 years of data, for 171 MFIs (49%) we have 4 years of data, for 93 MFIs (27%) we 
have three years of data, for 21 MFIs (6%) we have two years of data, and for 54 MFIs (15%) we have one 
observation. Missing values seem to be randomly distributed across the sample, so that we do not expect any 
bias from missing values. 
4 
It is not surprising that significance levels vary somewhat between estimation methods, given the fact that the 
different methods require different numbers of parameters to be estimated. Consequently, the number of degrees 
of freedom can vary substantially over the different methods. 
5 
Besides analyzing the significance of the interaction terms to see whether observed effects differ between 
categories, one can also analyze the significance for each distinct subgroup by performing a test on the sum of 
the reference group and interaction group using the delta method. This analysis indicates that the relation 
between gender and repayment is highly significant for NGOs, regulated MFIs, and individual-based lenders, in 
line with our other analyses. 
6 
In another unreported outlier–robustness check, we test whether the results remain stable when dropping 
observations in the lowest quartile for women clients. Again, we obtain similar results. Additionally, a squared 
term for the proportion of female clients was added to investigate a potential nonlinear relation between gender 
and repayment. The coefficient of the squared term is always insignificant, and the other terms remain stable. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics. 
 
This table presents summary statistics for key variables in our sample. Q1, Q2, and Q3 are the first, second, and third 
quartiles, respectively. Total assets are inferred from the balance sheet and measured in $1,000’s. Loan portfolio is the total 
amount of loans outstanding and is measured in $1,000’s. Clients is the total number of active credit and savings clients. 
Loan size is the average loan outstanding measured in dollars and defined as the gross outstanding portfolio per client. 
Experience measures the number of years the institution has carried out microfinance activities. Employers is the number of 
full-time employers active in the MFI. Staff efficiency is the total number of clients divided by the number of employers. 
Loan officer efficiency is the total number of clients divided by the number of loan officers. Annual return is the net result 
before extraordinary income and expenses, donations, and taxation and is measured in $1,000’s. Portfolio yield is the 
percentage yield on the MFI’s total portfolio. OSS is measured as operating income divided by operating expenses. Costs per 
dollar lent are operating expenses divided by total loan portfolio. dumNGO  is a dummy that is 1 if the MFI has an NGO-
status and 0 otherwise. dumRURAL is a dummy that is 1 if the MFI operates mainly or exclusively in rural areas. 
dumGROUP is a dummy that is 1 if the firm uses mainly group-lending methods. PaR30 is the portfolio at risk, that is, the 
part of the loan portfolio over 30 days overdue. Write-offs measure the portion of the total loan portfolio that has been written 
off and therefore accepted as a loss. Provision expense rate is the loss loan provision as a percentage of the total loan 
portfolio. Conscious gender bias is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the MFI has a conscious gender bias, and 0 otherwise. 
Women clients is the percentage of the MFI’s clients who are female. 
 n Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 St. dev. min. max. 
General          
Total assets 1,201 6,519 1,036 2,593 6,876 1,470 19 250,000 
Loan portfolio 1,217 4,225 752 1,918 4,921 6,222 12 59,700 
Clients 1,001 17,111 2,329 5,780 14,625 41,924 113 534,342 
Loan size 1,155 787 147 381 886 976 0 28,693 
Experience 1,201 9 4 7 12 8 0 84 
Employers 1,147 89 24 50 94 140 2 1,842 
Staff efficiency 1,138 129 67 108 170 100 2 1,893 
Loan officer efficiency 1,083 289 160 239 358 270 5 4,591 
Annual return 1,191 209 -14 48 254 701 -3,533 11,800 
Portfolio yield 1,147 0.39 0.24 0.34 0.49 0.24 0.02 5.00 
OSS 716 1.12 0.95 1.11 1.32 0.38 0.07 2.94 
Costs per dollar lent 1,170 0.27 0.14 0.20 0.34 0.20 0.01 0.80 
DumNGO 1,201 0.53 0 1 1 0.49 0 1 
DumRURAL 1,151 0.27 0 0 1 0.44 0 1 
DumGROUP 1,150 0.47 0 0 1 0.49 0 1 
Repayment         
PaR30 1,100 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.98 
Write-off rate 1,020 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.74 
Provision expense rate 1,075 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.06 0.63 
Gender         
Conscious gender bias 2,934 0.40 0 0 1 0.49 0 1 
Women clients 1,267 0.73 0.55 0.76 1 0.25 0.08 1 
 
Notes: Obvious special cases have been omitted from the analyses. In addition, the influence of outliers has been checked by 
re-running all analyses where the fifth and 95th percentiles of the variables have been removed. This robustness check is 
discussed in the text. Both gender variables women clients and conscious gender bias are assumed constant over the sample 
period. 
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Table 2. Correlations and univariate statistics. 
 
Panel A reports correlations between gender and repayment variables. Panel B reports median values in classes with a 
different female focus. Columns 1 to 4 report median values in classes that differ in the proportion of female borrowers. The 
classes correspond to different quartiles in the distribution of women clients, from very low (women clients < Q1 = 0.55) to 
low (Q1 = 0.55 < women clients < Q2 = 0.76) to high (Q2 = 0.76 < women clients < Q3 = 1) to very high (women clients > 
Q4 = 1). Columns 5 and 6 report, respectively, median values for MFIs with and without a conscious gender bias. 
 
Panel A. Correlations 
 Women clients PaR30 Write-off rate Provision expense rate 
Women clients 1    
PaR30 -0.02 1   
Write-off rate -0.09 0.12 1  
Provision expense rate -0.14 0.23 0.58 1 
 
 
Panel B. Univariate statistics 
 Women clients   Conscious gender bias 
 Very low Low High Very high Yes No 
PaR30 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Write-off rate  0.01 0.02 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.010 
Provision expense rate 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Total assets 3,149 1,866 2,506 1,225 1,973 2,648 
Portfolio yield 0.30 0.38 0.47 0.40 0.38 0.33 
OSS 1.16 1.14 1.11 0.99 1.10 1.12 
Loan size 931 525 218 101 157 653 
Loan portfolio 2,092 1,457 2,051 878 1,241 1,964 
Staff efficiency 102 99 120 112 142 98 
Costs per dollar lent 0.18 0.24 0.28 0.22 0.24 0.19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Gender and loan repayment. 
 
This table analyzes the impact of gender on loan repayment in terms of PaR30 (Panel A) and write-offs (Panel B). DumNGO 
is a dummy that is 1 if the MFI is an NGO, and 0 otherwise; DumGroup is a dummy that is 1 if the MFI provides loans on a 
group basis (such as village bankers or group lenders), and 0 otherwise; DumRURAL is 1 if the MFI operates mainly in rural 
areas, and 0 otherwise; and Dum performance pay is 1 if the MFI pays incentive-based salaries, and 0 otherwise. HDI is the 
human development index. All other variables are defined as in Table 1. OLS indicates that pooled OLS was used as the 
estimation method, RE means that a pooled RE model was estimated, and FEVD means that the FEVD estimator was used. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the MFI level are provided in parentheses. Time dummies are included in all regressions. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Repayment in terms of PaR30 
Dep. var. PaR30 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gender       
Women clients -0.05 -0.08 -0.09    
 (0.024)** (0.046)** (0.003)***    
Conscious gender bias    -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
    (0.012)* (0.012)** (0.001)*** 
Controls       
Experience 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.002) 
lnTA -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.009)** (0.004)*** (0.001)*** (0.006)* (0.003)*** (0.001)**** 
Loan size 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 
 (0.016) (0.025) (0.002)*** (0.015) (0.003) (0.001) 
Portfolio growth -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.021)*** (0.006)*** (0.002)*** (0.018)*** (0.005)*** (0.002)*** 
DumNGO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.001) (0.012) (0.012) (0.002) 
DumGROUP 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.002)*** (0.012) (0.011) (0.001) 
DumRURAL -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 
 (0.022)** (0.005)* (0.001)*** (0.014)** (0.012)** (0.002)*** 
Staff efficiency 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Credit officer efficiency 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dum performance pay 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.001) (0.011) (0.011) (0.001) 
No. MFIs per country 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001)* (0.002) (0.001)*** (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)*** 
HDI -0.14 -0.11 -0.13 -0.16 -0.14 -0.14 
 (0.078)** (0.062)*** (0.006)*** (0.057)*** (0.052)*** (0.006)*** 
N 830 830 830 1748 1748 1748 
R² 0.25 0.16 0.95 0.27 0.17 0.92 
F-statistic/Wald χ² 2.41*** 205.54*** 789.25*** 5.21*** 57.66*** 789.26*** 
Method OLS RE FEVD OLS RE FEVD 
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Panel B. Repayment in terms of write-offs 
Dep. var. write-off rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gender       
Women clients -0.03 -0.03 -0.03    
 (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.003)***    
Conscious gender bias    -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
    (0.006)** (0.006)* (0.001)*** 
Controls       
Experience 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
lnTA -0.003 -0.010 -0.011 -0.003 -0.004 -0.01 
 (0.002)** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.001)**** 
Loan size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Portfolio growth -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.001)*** (0.006)** (0.002)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.002)*** 
DumNGO 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** 
DumGROUP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) 
DumRURAL -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.002)* (0.006) (0.001)*** (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) 
Staff efficiency 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Credit officer efficiency 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dum performance pay 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.011) (0.001) 
No. MFIs per country 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HDI -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.006)** (0.026)* (0.026)* (0.006)*** 
N 773 773 773 1621 1621 1621 
R² 0.36 0.32 0.83 0.22 0.30 0.66 
F-statistic/Wald χ² 6.80*** 103.97*** 133.31*** 2.88*** 44.67*** 111.19*** 
Method OLS RE FEVD OLS RE FEVD 
 
Notes: Loan size has been scaled by a factor of 1/1000 to make the coefficients easy to read. To ensure sufficient 
observations, gender-variables and dummies are assumed constant over the sample-period and missing observations for 
continuous variables are imputed with mean-values. A number of robustness checks were carried out. We experimented with 
the gender development index instead of the human development index. DumGROUP was divided into separate dummies for 
village banking (DumVill) and solidarity groups (DumSol). Finally, we experimented with the inclusion of regional dummies 
and obtained similar results. 
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Table 4. Gender and provisions. 
We analyze the impact of gender on the loan loss provisions measured in terms of the provision expense rate. DumNGO is a 
dummy that is 1 if the MFI is an NGO, and 0 otherwise; DumGroup is a dummy that is 1 if the MFI provides loans on a 
group basis (such as village bankers or group lenders), and 0 otherwise; DumRURAL is 1 if the MFI operates mainly in rural 
areas, and 0 otherwise; and Dum performance pay is 1 if the MFI pays incentive-based salaries, and 0 otherwise. HDI is the 
human development index. All other variables are defined as in Table 1. OLS indicates that pooled OLS was used as the 
estimation method, RE means that a pooled RE model was estimated, and FEVD means that the FEVD estimator was used. 
Robust standard errors that are clustered at the MFI level are provided in parentheses. Time dummies are included in all 
regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dep. var. provision expense rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gender       
Women clients -0.03 -0.03 -0.02    
 (0.012)*** (0.012)* (0.003)***    
Conscious gender bias    -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
    (0.004)** (0.006) (0.001)*** 
Controls       
Experience 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
lnTA -0.001 -0.006 -0.01 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.004) (0.004)* (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)**** 
Loan size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Portfolio growth -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.008)*** (0.006)** (0.002)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)** (0.002)** 
DumNGO 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.005)* (0.005)* (0.001)*** (0.004)* (0.004) (0.001)*** 
DumGROUP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
DumRURAL 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
Staff efficiency 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Credit officer efficiency 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dum performance pay 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.011) (0.001) 
No. MFIs per country 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001)* (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HDI -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 
 (0.023)* (0.023) (0.006)*** (0.019)**** (0.017)*** (0.006)*** 
N 751 751 751 1624 1624 1624 
R² 0.28 0.28 0.77 0.15 0.18 0.59 
F-statistic/Wald χ² 11.86*** 134.92*** 87.11*** 10.08*** 56.56*** 103.38*** 
Method OLS RE FEVD OLS RE FEVD 
 
Notes: Loan size has been scaled by a factor of 1/1000 to make coefficients easy to read. To ensure sufficient observations, 
gender-variables and dummies are assumed constant over the sample-period and missing observations for continuous 
variables are imputed with mean-values. A number of robustness checks were carried out. We experimented with the gender 
development index instead of the human development index. DumGROUP was divided into separate dummies for village 
banking (DumVill) and solidarity groups (DumSol). We experimented with the inclusion of regional dummies and obtained 
similar results. Finally, we carried out a robustness check where the repayment variable is the sum of PaR30 and the write-off 
rate, because it is the sum of the two that might indicate the MFI’s ability to get loans repaid. Again, the gender variables are 
negative and significant. 
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Table 5. Interactions on the relation between gender and repayment. 
 
This table analyzes whether the positive effect of women on repayment differs with experience, legal status, activities, 
lending methodology, or regulation by investigating various interaction effects on the percentage of women clients (Panel A) 
and on the conscious gender bias dummy (Panel B), using RE. Dum fin.only is a dummy variable that is 1 if the MFI provides 
financial services only, and 0 if the MFI is engaged in other activities as well; DumVill is a dummy that is 1 if the MFI is a 
village bank, and 0 otherwise; DumSol is a dummy that is 1 if the MFI provides loans on the basis of solidarity groups, and 0 
otherwise; and Dum regulated is a dummy variable that is 1 if the MFI is regulated by banking authorities, and 0 otherwise. 
All other variables are defined as in previous tables. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the MFI level are provided in 
parentheses. Time dummies are included in all regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Percentage of women clients 
Dep. var. PaR30 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Women clients -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.11 -0.08 
 (0.038)* (0.055) (0.038)* (0.038)* (0.059)** (0.075)* 
(Women clients * experience) 0.01     0.00 
 (0.001)     (0.001) 
(Women clients * DumNGO)  -0.10    -0.11 
  (0.064)*    (0.067)* 
(Women clients * Dum fin.only)   0.01   0.01 
   (0.022)   (0.023) 
(Women clients * Dum regulated)    -0.04  -0.05 
    (0.031)  (0.032)* 
(Women clients * Dum Vill.)     0.09 0.11 
     (0.078) (0.080)* 
(Women clients * Dum Sol.)     0.06 0.09 
     (0.086) (0.088) 
Other controls Added Added Added Added Added Added 
N 830 830 830 830 830 830 
R² 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.23 
Wald chi2 100.15*** 102.82*** 100.38*** 101.68*** 104.26*** 113.83 
 
 
Panel B. Conscious gender bias dummy 
Dep. var. gender bias (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gender bias -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 
 (0.012)* (0.021)* (0.021)* (0.014)* (0.020)** (0.036)** 
(Gender bias * experience) 0.00     0.00 
 (0.004)     (0.004) 
(Gender bias * DumNGO)  -0.02    -0.03 
  (0.023)*    (0.014)* 
(Gender bias * Dum fin.only)   0.01   0.01 
   (0.021)   (0.021) 
(Gender bias * Dum regulated)    -0.06  -0.03 
    (0.024)*  (0.015)** 
(Gender bias * Dum Vill.)     0.05 0.05 
     (0.027)** (0.028)** 
(Gender bias * Dum Sol.)     0.03 0.03 
     (0.030)* (0.031)* 
Other controls Added Added Added Added Added Added 
N 1748 1748 1748 1748 1748 1748 
R² 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.18 
Wald chi2 67.49*** 67.82*** 67.04*** 65.12*** 69.76*** 68.24*** 
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Table 6. Split-sample regression for different organizational types. 
We regress repayment on the gender variables for different MFI types using pooled OLS. We distinguish between all MFIs, NGOs, cooperatives, and the category BK/NBFI/SB, which 
comprises banks, non-bank financial institutions, and state banks. Repayment is measured by the PaR30, write-offs, and the provision expense rate in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. Robust 
clustered standard errors are provided in parentheses. Time dummies are included in all regressions. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Repayment in terms of PaR30 
Category ALL  NGO  COOP  BK/NBFI/SB 
 PaR30 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Women clients -0.05  -0.09  -0.07  -0.01  
 (0.024)**  (0.063)***  (0.129)  (0.031)  
Conscious gender bias  -0.01  -0.01  -0.04  -0.03 
  (0.012)*  (0.013)*  (0.025)**  (0.022)* 
Other controls  Added Added Added Added Added Added Added Added 
Time dummies Added Added Added Added Added Added Added Added 
N 830 1748 606 1112 72 142 224 636 
R² 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.34 0.96 0.86 0.83 0.36 
F-stat 2.41*** 5.21*** 7.47*** 4.97*** NA NA 5.14*** 2.28*** 
 
 
Panel B. Repayment in terms of write-offs 
Category ALL  NGO  COOP  BK/NBFI/SB 
 Write-off rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Women clients -0.03  -0.05  -0.04  -0.01  
 (0.015)***  (0.022)***  (0.013)**  (0.019)  
Conscious gender bias  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.00 
  (0.006)**  (0.008)**  (0.002)***  (0.004) 
Other controls  Added Added Added Added Added Added Added Added 
Time dummies Added Added Added Added Added Added Added Added 
N 773 1621 556 1032 72 142 217 589 
R² 0.36 0.22 0.44 0.26 0.92 0.89 0.22 0.17 
F-stat 6.80*** 2.88*** 8.77*** 3.32*** NA NA 5.47*** 8.34*** 
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Panel C. Repayment in terms of provision expense rate 
Category ALL  NGO  COOP  BK/NBFI/SB 
Prov. expense rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Women clients -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.05  
 (0.012)***  (0.018)***  (0.238)  (0.015)***  
Conscious gender bias  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.01 
  (0.004)**  (0.005)  (0.006)***  (0.007) 
Other controls  Added Added Added Added Added Added Added Added 
Time dummies Added Added Added Added Added Added Added Added 
N 751 1624 537 993 62 132 214 631 
R² 0.28 0.15 0.30 0.20 0.93 0.65 0.40 0.15 
F-stat 11.86*** 10.08*** 3.50*** 4.31*** NA NA 5.46*** 4.82*** 
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Table 7. Robustness check for outliers. 
We regress repayment in terms of PaR30, write-off rate, and provision expense rate on women clients and conscious gender 
bias, controlling for other factors, using pooled OLS. Observations below 5% and above 95% for repayment variables are 
dropped. Robust clustered standard errors are provided in parentheses. Time dummies are included in all regressions. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Dep. var. PaR30  Write-off rate Provision expense rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Women clients -0.05  -0.03  -0.03  
 (0.025)**  (0.013)***  (0.012)***  
Conscious gender bias   -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.008)**  (0.004)*  (0.004)* 
Experience 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001)* (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
LnTA -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.006)* (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)* (0.004) (0.004) 
Loan size 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) 
Portfolio growth -0.03 -0.05 -0.004 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.016)** (0.012)*** (0.009)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
DumNGO 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 -0.008 (0.008)** (0.005)*** (0.003)** (0.004)** (0.004)*** 
DumGROUP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
DumRURAL -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.015)** (0.009)*** (0.005)* (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) 
Staff efficiency 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Credit officer efficiency 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dum performance pay 0.01 0.02 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) 
HDI -0.10 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 
 (0.048)*** (0.035)** -0.029 (0.012)** (0.018)** (0.042)*** 
N 808 1680 772 1600 736 1598 
R² 0.2 0.32 0.36 0.24 0.19 0.19 
F-stat 3.98*** 7.75*** 5.34*** 5.25*** 18.70*** 18.74*** 
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Table 8. Tobit truncated regressions. 
We regress repayment in terms of PaR30, write-off rate and provision expense rate on women clients and conscious gender 
bias, controlling for other factors, using Tobit truncated regressions. Robust clustered standard errors are provided in 
parentheses. Time dummies are included in all regressions. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Dep. var. PaR30  Write-off rate  Provision expense rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Women clients -0.04  -0.03  -0.03  
 (0.013)***  (0.016)**  (0.012)***  
Conscious gender bias   -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.011)*  (0.005)*  (0.005)*** 
Experience 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001)* (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
lnTA -0.01 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.008)* (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)** 
Loan size 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) 
Portfolio growth -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.019)** (0.016)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** 
DumNGO 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.018) (0.011) (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)** (0.004) 
DumGROUP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
DumRURAL -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.019)*** (0.012)** (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) 
Staff efficiency 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Credit officer efficiency 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dum performance pay 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011) (0.003) 
No. MFIs per country 0.002 0.002 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HDI -0.13 -0.14 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.069)*** (0.053)*** (0.029)* (0.025)** (0.023)** (0.017)*** 
N 830 1748 773 1621 751 1624 
Pseudo-R² 0.12 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.05 
F-stat 15.85*** 15.95*** 3.86*** 3.99*** 6.26*** 4.04*** 
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Appendix A.  
Distribution of the Sample across Countries 
 
For each country we report the number of MFIs, NGOs, cooperatives (COOPs), and banks. 
 
 
Country MFIs NGOs COOPs Bank/NBFI/state bank 
Albania 3 1 0 2   
Argentina 1 0 0 1   
Armenia 3 2 0 1   
Azerbaijan 6 0 0 6   
Bangladesh 2 2 0 0   
Benin 6 4 1 1   
Bolivia 15 13 0 2   
Bosnia Herzegovina 11 11 0 0   
Brazil 13 11 1 1   
Bulgaria 2 0 1 1   
Burkina Faso 3 0 3 0   
Cambodia 12 1 0 11   
Cameroon 4 0 0 4   
Chad 1 0 1 0   
Chile 2 0 1 1   
China 1 1 0 0   
Colombia 6 6 0 0   
Croatia 1 1 0 0   
Dominican Republic 4 3 0 1   
East Timor 1 0 0 1   
Ecuador 15 8 7 0   
Egypt 5 5 0 0   
El Salvador 4 2 0 2   
Ethiopia 9 0 0 9   
Gambia 1 0 1 0   
Georgia 6 5 0 1   
Ghana 3 2 0 1   
Guatemala 5 5 0 0   
Guinea 1 0 0 1   
Haiti 1 1 0 0   
Honduras 9 4 2 3   
India 31 24 3 4   
Indonesia 2 1 0 1   
Jordan 3 1 0 2   
Kazakhstan 4 0 0 4   
Kenya 9 4 0 5   
Kosovo 2 1 0 1   
Kyrgyzstan 3 1 1 1   
Madagascar 1 0 1 0   
Malawi 1 0 0 1   
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Mali 1 0 1 0   
Mexico 17 10 1 7   
Moldova 2 0 0 2   
Mongolia 2 0 0 2   
Morocco 5 5 0 0   
Mozambique 1 0 0 1   
Nepal 5 2 0 3   
Nicaragua 10 7 1 2   
Nigeria 3 2 0 1   
Pakistan 1 1 0 0   
Paraguay 1 0 0 1   
Peru 28 12 3 13   
Philippines 7 6 1 0   
Romania 1 0 0 1   
Russian Federation 15 3 10 2   
Rwanda 1 0 0 1   
Senegal 5 0 4 0   
Serbia 1 1 0 0   
South Africa 3 1 0 2   
Sri Lanka 1 1 0 0   
Tajikistan 5 4 0 1   
Tanzania 4 3 0 1   
Togo 1 1 0 0   
Trinidad and Tobago 1 0 0 1   
Tunisia 1 1 0 0   
Uganda 10 4 0 6   
Vietnam 1 1 0 0   
Yugoslavia 4 2 0 2   
Zambia 1 0 0 1   
Total  350 187 44 119   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
